Streetwise
Lauren Rudd
Sunday, May 12, 2013
Stocks Work - Doomsayers are Wrong
As the Dow Jones Industrial Average moved above the 15,000
mark, bedlam ensued on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. There were
shouts and hand clapping, an unusual show of emotion for that staid institution.
However, it was not the Dow’s metaphorical four digit
augmentation that was the epitome of my consternation that morning. Rather it
was the seemingly never ending phone calls asking if we were in the midst of
another bubble, circa the dot-com or housing boom eras. We are not.
Want it in simpler terms – every time there is a strong
market rally the Chicken Little syndrome sets in with financial Paul Reveres
shouting, the correction is coming, the correction is coming. The fear of
impending doom is simply a promulgation of incorrect assumptions based on
invalid data. The difficulty arises when you prattle under the auspices of being
a purveyor of truth and rational reasoning.
For example, Robert Schiller, one of the creators of the
Case-Schiller housing index says the gain in the housing market cannot last
because it is government supported.
Credit Suisse believes it is delusional to assume that you
can expect to increase your wealth by investing over the long term in the stock
market.
David Stockman, former director of the Office of Management
and Budget during the Reagan Administration, says, “Things are not what they
appear to be. We are being misled by artificially low interest rates and
speculation.”
While there is overwhelming data to refute those statements,
thanks to the First Amendment you can, without recrimination, go off half-cocked
blathering prose that is tantamount to carrying a sign saying, “Repent now, the
world is coming to an end,” or worse be blatantly wrong to those who trust your
expertise.
For example, the edifice of austerity economics rests largely
on an academic paper that was embraced by policy makers without it ever having
been vetted. Published by economists Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, and touted
by policymakers pushing government austerity, it is riddled with what are now
well known errors.
For example, there was a failure to include years of data
that showed Australia, Canada and New Zealand enjoying high economic growth and
high debt at the same time. The errors seriously erode the intellectual
underpinnings of the pro-austerity policy approach to government, while making
the damage done all the more poignant.
Niall Ferguson, the distinguished historian whose brand of
conservative punditry colors his rhetoric on historic events, was guilty of
incredulous bigotry at a recent investors’ conference.
Ferguson commented that John Maynard Keynes’ famous
statement, “In the long run we are all dead,” stemmed from the fact that he was
gay, had no intention of having children and was thus blinded to the importance
of long-run considerations.
Ferguson’s subsequent apology would have been more acceptable
had not Brad DeLong, a professor of economics at the University of California,
Berkeley, pointed out that Ferguson had previously alleged that Keynes' views on
the Treaty of Versailles were due to Keynes homosexuality.
Specifically, Ferguson's view is that Keynes had a
distinctive gay outlook on the issue and a gay crush on a German representative
to the conference that led Keynes to adopt pro-German and pro-inflation
opinions.
Interestingly, Keynes’ too-often quoted long run statement
appears not in Keynes’ meteoric work, A General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money, but rather in a 1923’s Tract on Monetary Reform. Writing about the
fallacy of returning to a gold standard, Keynes stated, “...the long run is a
misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead.”
Finally, consider the recent $2 billion trading loss at J.P. Morgan Chase. The
loss resulted from trades whose complexity overwhelmed the traders themselves
and who in turn simply implemented the better to ignore than show ignorance
policy. And to the bank’s customers and shareholders came only an empty apology
from CEO Jamie Dimon.